Traveller screening is being used to limit further global spread of 2019 novel coronavirus (nCoV) 15
Our previous analysis considered the contributions of both departure and arrival screening 45 programs, focusing on the context of international spread of infections via air travel. In the 46 current context of the nCoV outbreak, both departure and arrival screening have been proposed 47 and implemented in some countries, though neither approach is likely to be applied uniformly to 48 all air travellers. Traveller screening is also being applied in other contexts, including at 49 roadside spot checks on major routes out of Wuhan. These are directly analogous to departure 50 screens in our earlier analysis, i.e. one-off screening efforts with no delay due to travel duration. 51 52
As of January 28, 2020, the Chinese government has been expanding the geographic area and 53 modes of transportation subject to strong travel restrictions. If there was perfect compliance and 54
the restricted area encompassed all areas with community transmission of the virus, then these 55 measures could in theory eliminate the necessity of wider traveller screening. However, 56
multiple factors point to on-going risk, including the existence of substantial numbers of cases in 57 several population centers outside Wuhan (World Health Organization, n.d.), and very early in 58 the outbreak, reports of citizens seeking to elude the restrictions or leaving before restrictions 59 were in place. As the virus continues to spread within China, and as cases continue to appear in 60 other countries, the risk of exportation of cases from beyond the current travel-restricted area is 61 likely to grow. 62 63
As a result, increasing emphasis has been placed on the effectiveness of arrival screening to 64 prevent importation of cases to areas without established spread. At the same time, there is 65 great concern about potential public health consequences if nCoV spreads to developing 66 countries that lack health infrastructure and resources to combat it effectively. Limited 67 resources also could mean that some countries cannot implement large-scale arrival screening. 68
In this scenario, departure screening would be the sole barrier --however leaky --to importation 69 of cases into these countries. It is also important to recognize that, owing to the lag time in 70 appearance of symptoms in imported cases, any weaknesses in screening would continue to 71 have an effect on case importations for up to two weeks (roughly, the maximum reported 72 incubation period) after changes in screening policy or epidemic context in the source region. 73 Accordingly, we consider scenarios with departure screening only, arrival screening only, or 74 both departure and arrival screening. The model can also consider the consequences when 75 only a fraction of the traveller population is screened, due either to travel from a location not 76 subject to screening, or due to deliberate evasion of screening. 77 78
The central aim of our analysis is to assess the expected effectiveness of screening for nCoV, 79
taking account of current knowledge and uncertainties about the natural history and 80 epidemiology of the virus. We therefore show results using the best estimates currently 81 available, in the hope of informing policy decisions in this fast-changing environment. We also 82 make our model available for public use as a user-friendly online app, so that stakeholders can 83 explore scenarios of particular interest, and results can be updated rapidly as our knowledge of 84
this new viral threat continues to expand. 85 86
Results

88
Model 89 90
The core model has been described previously (Gostic et al., 2015) , but to summarize briefly, it 91 assumes infected travellers can be detained due to the presence of detectable symptoms (fever 92 or cough), or due to self-reporting of exposure risk via questionnaires or interviews. Before 93 screening, travellers can be classified into one of four categories: (1) symptomatic and aware 94 that exposure may have occurred, (2) symptomatic but not aware of exposure risk, (3) aware of 95 exposure risk but without detectable symptoms, and (4) neither symptomatic nor aware of 96 exposure risk ( Fig. 1) . Travellers in the final category are fundamentally undetectable, and 97 travellers in the third category are only detectable if aware that they have been exposed and 98 willing to self report. 99 100
In the model, screening for symptoms occurs prior to questionnaire-based screening for 101 exposure risk, and detected cases do not progress to the next stage. This approach allows us to 102 track the fraction of cases detected using symptom screening or risk screening at arrival or 103 departure. Additionally, the model keeps track of four ways in which screening can miss infected 104 travellers: (1) due to imperfect sensitivity, symptom screening may fail to detect symptoms in 105 travellers that display symptoms; (2) questionnaires may fail to detect exposure risk in travellers 106 aware they have been exposed, owing to deliberate obfuscation or misunderstanding; (3)  107 screening may fail to detect both symptoms and known exposure risk in travellers who have 108 both and (4) travellers not exhibiting symptoms and with no knowledge of their exposure are 109 fundamentally undetectable. Here, we only consider infected travellers who submit to screening. 110
However, the supplementary app allows users to consider scenarios in which some fraction of 111 infected travellers intentionally evade screening ( Fig. 1E ). 112 113
Parameters 114 115
The probability that an infected traveller is detectable in a fever screen depends on: the 116 incubation period (the time from exposure to onset of detectable symptoms); the proportion of 117 subclinical cases (mild cases that never develop detectable symptoms); the sensitivity of 118 thermal scanners used to detect fever; the fraction of cases aware they have high exposure risk; 119 and the fraction of those cases who would self-report truthfully on a screening questionnaire. 120
Further, the distribution of individual times since exposure affects the probability that any single 121 infected traveller has progressed to the symptomatic stage. In a growing epidemic, the majority 122 of infected cases will have been recently exposed, and will not yet show symptoms. We used 123 methods described previously to estimate the distribution of individual times since exposure for 124 different parameter regimes (Gostic et al., 2015) . Briefly, the model assumes the fraction of 125 cases who are recently exposed increases with R0. The distribution of times since exposure is 126 truncated at a maximum value, which corresponds epidemiologically to the maximum time from 127 exposure to patient isolation, after which point we assume cases will not attempt to travel. 128
(Isolation may occur due to hospitalization, or due to confinement at home in response to 129 escalating symptoms or nCoV diagnosis). 
References and rationale
Mean incubation period 5.5 days Sensitivity: 4.5 days or 6.5 days 4.5-6.5 days 3-6 days ( At the time of this writing, nCoV-specific estimates are available for most of these parameters, 145 but almost all have been derived from limited or preliminary data sources and remain subject to 146 considerable uncertainty. Table 1 and the Methods summarize the current state of knowledge.  147 Here, we used two distinct approaches to incorporate this uncertainty into our analysis. 148 149
First, to estimate the probability that an infected individual would be detected or missed (Fig. 2) , 150
we considered a range of plausible values for the mean incubation time, and the fraction of 151 subclinical cases. We focus on these two parameters because screening outcomes are 152 particularly sensitive to their values. All other parameters used to generate Fig. 2 were fixed to 153 the best available estimates listed in Table 1 . 154 155
Second, we considered a population of infected travellers, each with a unique time of exposure, 156
and in turn a unique probability of having progressed to the symptomatic stage. Here, the model 157 used a resampling-based approach to simultaneously consider uncertainty from both (1) 158 stochasticity in any single individual's screening outcome, and (2) uncertainty as to the true, 159
underlying natural history parameters driving the epidemic. Details are provided in the methods, 160
but briefly, we constructed 1000 plausible parameter sets, drawn using Latin hypercube 161 sampling from plausible ranges for each parameter (Table 1) . Using each parameter set, we 162 simulated screening outcomes for a population of 100 infected individuals. Individual probabilities of a given screening outcome 168 169
Our model outputs the probability of different screening outcomes through time, including the 170 overall likelihood of detecting the infected traveller and the different contributions to success or 171 failure. First, we explored the probability that any particular infected individual would be detected 172 by a screening program, as a function of the time between exposure and the initiation of travel 173 (Fig. 2) . A crucial driver of the effectiveness of traveller screening programs is the duration of 174 the incubation period, particularly since infected people are most likely to travel before the onset 175 of symptoms. Here we considered three scenarios with different mean incubation periods: 5.5 176 days is most consistent with most existing estimates, while 4.5 and 6.5 days provide a 177 sensitivity analysis roughly consistent with ranges, confidence or credible intervals reported the narrow range tested, screening outcomes were sensitive to the incubation period mean. For 180 longer incubation periods, we found that larger proportions of departing travellers would not yet 181 be exhibiting symptoms -either at departure or arrival -which in turn reduced the probability 182 that screening would detect these cases, especially since we assume few infected travellers will 183 realize they have been exposed to nCov. (below) from missed cases (above). Here, we assume flight duration = 24 hours, the probability 191 that an individual is aware of exposure risk is 0.2, the sensitivity of fever scanners is 0.7, and 192 the probability that an individual will truthfully self-report on risk questionnaires is 0.25. Table 1  193 lists all other input values. 194
A second crucial uncertainty is the proportion of cases that will develop detectable symptoms. 195 We considered scenarios in which 5%, 25% and 50% of cases are subclinical, representing a 196 best, middle and worst-case scenario, respectively. The middle and worst-case scenarios have 197 predictable and discouraging consequences for the effectiveness of traveller screening, since 198 they render large fractions of the population undetectable by fever screening (Fig. 2) . 199
Furthermore, mild cases who are unaware of their exposure risk are never detectable, by any 200
means. This is manifested as the bright red 'undetectable' region which persists well beyond the 201 mean incubation period. For a screening program combining departure and arrival screening, as 202 shown in Fig. 2 , the greatest contributor to case detection is the departure fever screen. The 203 arrival fever screen is the next greatest contributor, with its value arising from two factors: the 204 potential to detect cases whose symptom onset occurred during travel, and the potential to 205 catch cases missed due to imperfect instrument sensitivity in non-contact infrared thermal 206 scanners used in traveller screening (Table 1) . Considering the effectiveness of departure or 207 arrival screening only (Fig 2 -Supplementary figure 1-2) , we see that fever screening is the 208 dominant contributor in each case, but that the risk of missing infected travellers due to 209 undetected fever is substantially higher when there is no redundancy from two successive 210 screenings. 211 212 213
Overall screening effectiveness in a population of infected travellers during a growing epidemic 214 215
Next we computed population-level estimates of the effectiveness of different screening 216 programs, as well as the uncertainties arising from the current partial state of knowledge about 217 this recently-emerged virus. To do so, we modeled plausible population-level outcomes by 218
tracking the fraction of infected travellers detained, given a growing epidemic and current 219 uncertainty around parameter values. We separately consider the best, middle and worst-case 220 scenarios for the proportion of infections that are subclinical, and for each scenario we compare 221 the impact of departure screening only, arrival screening only, or programs that include both. 222 223
The striking finding is that even under the best-case assumptions, with just one infection in 224
twenty being subclinical and all travellers passing through departure and arrival screening, the 225 median fraction of infected travellers detected is only 0.34, with 95% interval extending from 226 0.20 up to 0.50 (Fig. 3A) . The total fraction detected is lower for programs with only one layer of 227 screening, with arrival screening preferable to departure screening owing to the possibility of 228 symptom onset during travel. Considering higher proportions of subclinical cases, the overall 229 effectiveness of screening programs is further degraded, with a median of just one in ten 230 infected travellers detected by departure screening in the worst-case scenario. The key driver of 231 these poor outcomes is that, even in the best-case scenario, nearly two thirds of infected 232 travellers will not be detectable (as shown by the red regions in Fig. 3B ). This is because in a 233 growing epidemic, the majority of travellers will have been recently infected and hence will not 234 yet have progressed to the symptomatic stage, and because we assume that few are aware of 235 their exposure risk. As above, the dominant contributor to successful detections is fever 236 screening. 237 plots of the fraction of infected travellers detected, accounting for current uncertainties by 240 running 1000 simulations using parameter sets randomly drawn from the ranges shown in Table  241 1. Dots and vertical line segments show the median and central 95%, respectively. Text above 242 each violin shows the median fraction detected. (B) Mean fraction of travellers with each 243 screening outcome. The black dashed lines separate detected cases (below) from missed 244 cases (above). 245
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We have developed an interactive web application using Shiny in which users can replicate our 248 analyses using parameter inputs that reflect the most up-do-date information. The 249 supplementary user interface can be accessed at 250 https://faculty.eeb.ucla.edu/lloydsmith/screeningmodel. Please note that while the results in Fig.  251 3 consider a range of plausible values for each parameter, the outputs of the Shiny app are 252 calculated using fixed, user-specified values only. 253 254 255 256
Discussion 257 258
The international expansion of nCoV cases has led to travel screening measures being 259
proposed and implemented in numerous countries. Given the rapid growth of the epidemic in 260
China, emphasis on these measures is likely to rise in an attempt to prevent community spread 261 of the virus in new geographic areas. Using a mathematical model of screening with preliminary 262 estimates of nCoV epidemiology and natural history, we found that screening will in the best 263 case only detect less than half of infected travellers. We found that two main factors influenced 264 the effectiveness of screening. First, symptom screening depends on the natural history of an 265 infection: individuals are increasingly likely to show detectable symptoms with increasing time 266 since exposure. A fundamental challenge of screening is that many infected individuals will 267 travel during their incubation period, a point at which they still feel healthy enough to travel but 268 are simultaneously most difficult to detect. This effect is amplified when the incubation period is 269 longer; infected individuals have a longer window in which they may travel with low probability of 270 detection. Second, screening depends on whether exposure risk factors exist that would 271 facilitate specific and reasonably sensitive case detection by questionnaire. For nCoV, there is 272 so far limited evidence for specific risk factors; we therefore assumed that at most 40% of 273 travellers would be aware of a potential exposure, and that a minority would self-report their 274 exposure honestly, which led to limited effectiveness in questionnaire-based screening. should be taken into account when estimating screening effectiveness. Further, transmission 295 occurred before the onset of symptoms in one recent case report (Rothe et al., 2020). While it is 296 too early to draw conclusions from a single case report, determining whether pre-symptomatic 297 transmission is the norm also has major implications for the risk of establishing on-going spread 298
in new locales . 299 300
As country-specific screening policies can change rapidly in real-time, we focused on a general 301 screening framework rather than specific case studies. We also assumed traveller adherence 302 and no active evasion of screening. However, there are informal reports of people taking 303 antipyretics to beat fever screening (Mahbubani, 2020), which would further reduce the 304 effectiveness of these methods. With travel restrictions in place, individuals may also take 305 alternative routes (e.g. road rather than air), which would in effect circumvent departure and/or 306 arrival screening as a control measure. Our quantitative findings may overestimate screening 307 effectiveness if many travellers evade screening. 308 309
Our results have several implications for the design and implementation of control measures. 310
Arrival screening could delay the introduction of cases if the infection is not yet present (Cowling 311 et al., 2010), or reduce the initial rate of spread by limiting the number of parallel chains of 312 transmission initially present in a country. But because screening is inherently leaky, it is crucial 313
to also have measures in place to identify cases missed at arrival screening. For example, 314 travellers could be provided with an information card to self-screen and self-report (Public 315
Health England, n.d.), alongside increased general surveillance/alertness in healthcare settings. 316 We should not take false confidence from reports that infected travellers are being detected by 317 existing screening programs. Our findings indicate that for every case detected by travel 318 screening, one or more infected travellers were not caught, and must be found and isolated by 319 other means. 320 321
The expected high miss rate of screening programs also has implications for assessing when 322 different programs are worthwhile investments. For areas yet to experience community-based 323 transmission of the virus, and subject to substantial traveller inflows from affected areas, arrival 324 screening can delay importation of cases and build awareness among incoming travellers. 325
Even once there is some early-stage community transmission in a specific location, arrival 326 screening may still reduce the chance of multiple independent transmission chains and ease the 327 work of contact tracing teams, although the relative benefit of such screening for overall case 328 prevention with decline as local transmission increases. Once there is generalized spread which 329 has outpaced contact tracing, departure screening to prevent export of cases to new areas will 330 be more valuable than arrival screening to identify additional incoming cases. However the 331 cost-benefit tradeoff for any screening policy should be assessed in light of past experiences, 332
where few or no infected travellers have been detected by such programs (Gostic et al., 2015) . 333
334
Several factors could potentially strengthen the screening measures described here. With 335 improved efficiency of thermal scanners or other symptom detection technology, we would 336 expect a smaller difference between the effectiveness of arrival-only screening and combined 337 departure and arrival screening in our analysis. Alternatively, the benefits of redundant 338 screening (noted above for programs with departure and arrival screens) could be gained in a 339 single-site screening program by simply having two successive fever-screening stations that 340 travellers pass through (or taking multiple measurements of each traveller at a single station). 341
As risk factors become better known, questionnaires could be refined to identify more potential 342 cases. Alternatively, less stringent definition of high exposure risk (e.g. contact with anyone with 343 respiratory symptoms) would be more sensitive. These approaches would boost sensitivity of 344
screening, but could also incur a large cost in terms of false positives detained, especially 345 during influenza season. 346 347
The availability of rapid PCR tests would also be beneficial for case identification at arrival, and 348 would address concerns with false-positive detections. Modeling strategy 374 375
The model's structure is summarized above (Fig. 1) , and detailed methods have been described 376
previously (Gostic et al., 2015) . Here, we summarize relevant extensions, assumptions and 377 parameter inputs. 378 379
Extensions 380 381
Our previous model tracked all the ways in which infected travellers can be detected by 382 screening (fever screen, or risk factor screen at arrival or departure). Here, we additionally keep 383 track of the many ways in which infected travellers can be missed (i.e. missed given fever 384 present, missed given exposure risk present, missed given both present, or missed given 385 undetectable the incubation period distribution for nCoV, concluding that a Weibull distribution provided the 411 best fit to data, but that a gamma distribution performed almost as well. We proceed by adopting 412 their best-fit gamma distribution (mean 5.7 days, s.d. 2.6, or alternatively, shape = 4.8, scale = 413 1.2), as the gamma form is more computationally convenient within our model. In order to vary 414 the mean incubation period in our uncertainty analyses while maintaining the shape of this two-415 parameter distribution, we fix the scale parameter to 1.2, and set the shape parameter equal to 416 !"#$ %.' (Fig. 3 -supplementary figure 1) . 417
418
Effectiveness of exposure risk questionnaires 419 420
The probability that an infected traveller is detectable using questionnaire-based screening for 421 exposure risk will be highest if specific risk factors are known. Other than close contact with a 422 known nCoV case, or contact with the Hunan seafood wholesale market in the earlier phase of 423 the outbreak in Wuhan, we are not aware that any specific risk factors have been identified. 424
Given the relative anonymity of respiratory transmission, we assume that a minority of infected 425 travellers would realize that they have been exposed before symptoms develop (20% in Fig. 2,  426 range 5-40% in Fig. 3 ). Further, relying on a previous upper-bound estimate (Gostic et al., 2015) 427
we assume that only 25% of travellers would self-report truthfully if aware of elevated exposure 428 risk. 429 430 Table 1 summarizes the state of knowledge about additional key natural history parameters, as 431 of January 28, 2020. 432 . 524
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